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Surprising Commons 
Carol M. Rose* 
Let me begin this article on “surprising commons” with a few 
words about another article that I wrote some years ago, in the mid-
1980s. It was called The Comedy of the Commons, and in it, I tried to 
figure out a peculiar and very long-standing legal pattern in which 
some kinds of terrain systematically resist privatization and instead 
remain in a state of more or less open access.1 It is not a large 
category, but what makes this kind of territory interesting is that it 
has a legal land use profile that is quite different from the ordinary 
pattern for land. Land normally can become private property and 
indeed is generally expected to turn into private property, with some 
exceptions for property owned by governmental entities—and even 
the latter category is unlikely to be held in a condition of complete 
open access. 
I suspect that The Comedy of the Commons is the reason that I am 
here today, as a figure something like “The Old Lady of the 
Commons.” The article did create a minor flurry at the time it came 
out, though certainly not as much as I would have liked. Of course, 
academics always would like more fuss about their work than the 
work actually gets, but with this one in particular, I had hoped for 
more attention in what was then a voluminous literature about the 
“public trust” in natural resources. I thought to myself for a while 
that I should have put the words “public trust” in the title, but then 
I more or less forgot about the whole thing and went on to other 
petty grievances about later articles that in my opinion were 
dreadfully under-cited. 
But then, to my amazement, The Comedy of the Commons turned 
out to have a second life fifteen or twenty years later, thanks to some 
 
* Ashby Lohse Professor of Water and Natural Resource Law, University of Arizona Rogers 
College of Law, and Gordon Bradford Tweedy Professor of Law and Organization (emer.), 
Yale Law School. I would like to thank the organizers of this symposium for all the work they 
have done to get us all here and talking to one another, particularly Brigham Daniels, who did 
so much to bring us all here, as well as Nicole Sofe, who has made all the logistics so smooth. 
 1. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public 
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986). 
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unknown person who told Larry Lessig to have a look at it. Larry 
Lessig and Yochai Benkler are among our main gurus of the idea of 
an open Internet, and the two of them, to my great delight, thought 
that my Comedy was just the ponderous citation they needed to show 
what is positive and helpful about open access.2 Thanks to them, I 
have gotten a second chance to dine out on that old article, as a 
friend of mine puts it; and indeed, the dining is even better in the 
second round.3 
And so, what happened to The Comedy of the Commons was 
definitely a pleasant surprise. But that is not actually the surprise that 
I want to talk about now. What I want to talk about is the more 
general phenomenon of surprises in real resources that are called 
“commons” or “commonses.” Hence the title, Surprising Commons: 
the commons can surprise you. 
In one sense, one thing that should be a surprise is the fact that 
we have a phrase like “the commons” at all. For this we have to 
thank Garrett Hardin, whose famous essay tacked the fateful word 
“tragedy” onto the commons.4 For all the problems in Hardin’s 
essay, it did usher in an importantly catchy phrase, and it induced 
many other scholars to think systematically about what happens to 
resources that are open to all. But Garrett Hardin’s famous Tragedy 
of the Commons did not treat the fate of the commons as at all 
surprising and neither did other natural resource economists whose 
work preceded Hardin’s. Before Hardin’s famous essay, Scott 
Gordon had written an analysis that was quite similar, although more 
technical, with a dreadful name: The Economic Theory of a Common-
Property Resource: The Fishery.5 You can guess why Hardin, rather 
than Gordon, became the iconic figure in this line of thinking. But 
Gordon was like Hardin in thinking that the decimation of open-
access resources was to be expected. For both, the whole point was 
to analyze the reasons why commons tragedies are the way things 
 
 2. Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Sharable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a 
Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273, 296 n.77 (2004); Lawrence Lessig, 
Recrafting a Public Domain, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 56, 64 (2006). 
 3. The latest gratifying citation arrived with JEREMY RIFKIN, THE ZERO MARGINAL 
COST SOCIETY: THE INTERNET OF THINGS, THE COLLABORATIVE COMMONS, AND THE 
ECLIPSE OF CAPITALISM 157–58 (2014) (making much of this old article). 
 4. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
 5. H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 
62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954). 
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are, at least in the absence of consciously chosen constraints, rather 
than to question whether the commons might come out some 
other way. 
Why did these scholars see commons tragedies as simply the 
nature of things? One way to look at this is simply as a description. 
Look around and you will see that people overuse things that are 
freely available or they free ride on the work of others when it is 
possible. As a result, at least with respect to physical resources, we 
decimate grasslands, we overfish open fisheries, we chop down 
forests, and we pour junk into the air and the water. That is Hardin’s 
description, and it is at least recognizable. With respect to 
intellectual resources, there is nothing physical to destroy, but we 
take a free ride on the ideas and efforts of others, and in so doing we 
undermine creativity by making it harder for originators to capitalize 
on their own creativity. 
The more interesting way to look at these issues is not simply 
descriptive, but analytic. Commons issues can be analyzed as 
collective action problems, which themselves are multi-person 
versions of the “prisoners’ dilemma” (PD)6—a scenario in which the 
best collective payoff occurs if the actors cooperate, but in which the 
actors’ individual motivations drive against cooperation. While 
people do in fact reach cooperative solutions, a point to which I will 
return later, those solutions ultimately depend on moments of 
generosity or trust that are out of line with conventional rational 
actors’ behavior—what Jon Elster has called a “magical” belief that 
others will reciprocate one’s cooperative actions.7 But there is no 
reason to expect that magic to occur, either in PDs or in the multi-
person commons. 
According to these theorists of the commons, then, there is logic 
behind our rationale of selfish behavior, even if it is ultimately 
ruinous to the common resource. We behave as we do not because 
we are evil, but because we have every reason to believe that others 
behave in this way. Our own behavior is not even simply a matter of 
playing copycat; it rather derives from a realistic reckoning of the 
situation, a kind of rational response. If we go lightly and conserve 
 
 6. For a discussion of the dominance of the prisoners’ dilemma among game theory 
stories, see Carol Rose, Game Stories, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 369, 382–91 (2010). 
 7. JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 5, 195–
201 (1989). 
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resources, will those resources be saved? Will we have teeming 
fisheries, intact forests, clean air and water? No. All that will happen 
is that we fall behind those who are not conserving resources; they 
will take what we have not taken, and our abstemiousness will just 
hurt us and do nothing for the resources that others squander in our 
stead. The tragic part of the tragedy of the commons is that even 
people who would like to do better do not think they can 
change things. 
In short, according to this well-known and lugubrious caricature, 
commons tragedies are built into the nature of collective action. 
They should not be a surprise to anyone. 
But in fact, commons tragedies are a surprise. We have one 
example after another of how astonished people are by commons 
problems, including commons problems that degrade physical 
resources, which one would think we would notice. We are 
surprised, first, that we have a commons problem at all, and second, 
that the problem has something to do with open access to resources. 
Let me give some examples. In 1883, sportsmen from the 
eastern United States got themselves outfitted and came out on the 
new railroads to the western plains, hoping to repeat the grand bison 
slaughter of the previous years.8 After all, they had seen or heard 
about the bison herds—unimaginably large, an inexhaustible tide of 
animals. And what did the hunters find? An empty, silent plain. We 
all know what had happened: the bison had been hunted practically 
to extinction. The great herds were gone. The newly outfitted 
hunters had not even realized that there could be a problem about 
bison because there had been so many. 
Fifty-plus years later, in the early 1940s, citizens of Los Angeles 
found that their valley was filled with an acrid, fumy smog. They 
thought it must be coming from a wartime synthetic-rubber plant, 
which they proceeded to shut down.9 Then they were surprised to 
find that, no, it was not the synthetic-rubber plant after all, because 
nothing changed. The cause was their own cars and trucks. What? 
Impossible! It cannot be us, with our little-bitty cars and trucks. But 
it was. They knew they had a problem, but they did not realize that 
 
 8. JAMES A. TOBER, WHO OWNS THE WILDLIFE? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
CONSERVATION IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 100–102 (1981). 
 9. JAMES E. KRIER & EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY: A CASE ESSAY ON 
CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION, 1940–
1975, 52–54 (1977). 
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it was a commons problem. 
Forty years later, from about 1980 onward, just about everything 
about climate change has been a surprise. The hole in the ozone 
layer was the first major atmospheric event that people noticed 
widely, thanks to satellite observations.10 Oh my goodness, there is a 
hole in the ozone layer, and we are all going to fry! Or at least, we 
are all going to have an elevated risk of skin cancer. As one of my 
friends said, he was raised to think that the atomic bomb would 
destroy the earth, but it turns out that the culprit will be aerosol 
underarm deodorant. Who knew? 
A little later, it was, oh my goodness, the polar ice caps are 
melting.11 Who knew? Now the culprit turns out to be our own coal-
fired electricity plants and our own trucks and autos, along with 
everything else that produces carbon dioxide and other greenhouse 
gases—and that is a lot of things. And more recently, here is one of 
the latest surprises: jellyfish are taking over the oceans.12 There are so 
many jellyfish that one Japanese fishing vessel capsized when trying 
to pull up a net that the fishers thought was full of fish. It was not. It 
was full of jellies, and they were far too heavy for the boat to 
manage. Unlike other fish, jellies can live in severely de-oxygenated 
water, so they do not mind pollution, and they don’t mind it if the 
other fish have died off and are not around to eat their larvae either. 
And speaking of jellies’ larvae, those little things just love to breed 
on the hard plastic surfaces of junk that sticks in the craw of other 
fish and tangles up waterfowl and drowns them.13 Not that the jellies 
need the plastic in order to breed—they apparently can breed in 
profusion just about anywhere. They do breed just about 
everywhere, too, because they get sucked up into the ballast water of 
ocean-going vessels and then hitch rides all over the watery world. 
Some of Australia’s most deadly and poisonous jellies are starting to 
show up in the waters off Florida.14 Presumably some may say that 
 
 10. See OZONE HOLE, http://www.theozonehole.com/ozoneholehistory.htm (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2014) (brief history of ozone depletion and its discovery). 
 11. See Justin Gillis & Kenneth Chang, Scientists Warn of Rising Ocean from Polar Melt, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2014, at A1 (describing early warnings of sea rise due to ice cap melt). 
 12. Tim Flannery, They’re Taking Over!, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Sept. 26, 2013), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/sep/26/jellyfish-theyre-taking-
over/?pagination =false&printpage=true (reviewing LISA-ANN GERSHWIN, STUNG!: ON 
JELLYFISH BLOOMS AND THE FUTURE OF THE OCEAN (2013)). 
 13. See id. 
 14. See id. 
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the current superabundance of jellies is just a natural variation, but 
one cannot help but wonder about this, given their prodigious 
hardiness amidst human overuse of the ocean commons—that is, our 
taking far too much out in the case of other fish stocks, and in the 
case of pollutants, putting far too much in. 
Anyone could think of more examples, but just for that reason, 
we should all be expecting the nasty outcomes that we get from 
uncontrolled commons situations. But instead, those nasty outcomes 
all too often seem to take us by surprise—even the physical 
problems, the ones that we ought to be able to see with our eyes. 
A parenthesis here: all the items that I have mentioned so far 
come from what political scientist and Nobel Prize winner Elinor 
Ostrom called “open access” and not what she considered the true 
“commons.”15 What she meant by commons is a more traditional 
understanding, one that long predates Hardin’s usage: a limited 
common resource that benefits a particular community of users and 
that is governed by that same community. For now, I am going to 
stick with the commons as open access—the Hardin version of the 
commons rather than the Ostrom version. I will take up the Ostrom 
version a little later, particularly to show some ways that the Ostrom 
limited commons can be useful for solving some of the surprises 
lurking in Hardin’s open-access commons. 
With that, I want to turn to the reasons why commons problems 
surprise us. 
I. WHY THE SURPRISE? 
Perhaps the most ordinary source of surprise about commons 
problems is a characteristic that is shared by most commons: each 
commons problem is an accumulation of small events over time, 
none of which seems very significant at the time. The smog in the 
Los Angeles basin is an example: there and elsewhere smog is caused 
by the combustion of thousands and then millions of autos and 
trucks, each emitting what are actually quite small amounts of the 
gases that are transformed into smog by sunlight. No wonder people 
were surprised. How could such small leakages be responsible for the 
miserable air quality throughout the huge Los Angeles basin? 
Carbon-caused climate issues have a similar pattern. A great 
 
 15. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF 
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990). 
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number of things emit carbon dioxide, but so what? It is not 
poisonous, indeed the plants need it to grow, and we need the plants 
in order to survive. Besides, the air mantel is huge and the oceans 
absorb a lot of carbon dioxide, as do all those plants. So, what could 
be the problem if another new factory starts burning fossil fuels? And 
those jellyfish blooms and fish die-offs are similar: sure, we dump a 
lot of junk and gunk into the rivers, and the rivers flow into the 
oceans, but the oceans are massive. So how could that stuff really 
have an effect on aquatic life? Who could see all this coming? 
This, then, is one major reason why commons problems are 
surprising: so many of them arise from an accumulation of relatively 
small-scale events, none of which seems very significant 
taken alone.16 
Another and closely related source of surprise is what one might 
call the “unexpected environmental byproduct effect.” The effect 
emerges when efforts that are taken for one purpose and one set of 
reasons generate unexpected consequences in some unnoticed or 
unpredicted environmental realm. Take, for example, roadways that 
are constructed in rainforest areas. The roads are built in order to 
help people get in and out of these remote areas, so that they can 
settle there, get around, and get to market. Settlement obviously has 
foreseeable effects on the rainforest; settlers are almost certainly 
going to cut down some trees. But the roads themselves have 
consequences: they allow sunlight to enter, the sunlight dries out the 
vegetation, and dried-out vegetation catches fire easily or permits 
erosion. Meanwhile, the roads provide corridors for invasive plant 
and animal species, while they block the crossing movements of 
native species.17 
Another example comes from the early years of the twentieth 
century: researchers found that lead additives in gasoline could 
enhance the performance of motor vehicles, particularly by reducing 
engine knock. But the lead additives vaporized into the air. Then 
 
 16. See also Bonnie J. McCay, Emergence of Institutions for the Commons: Contexts, 
Situations, and Events, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS 361, 365–69 (Elinor Ostrom et al. 
eds., 2002) (noting the lack of knowledge of commons depletion and the lack of attribution to 
human causes). 
 17. Carol M. Rose, Big Roads, Big Rights: Varieties of Public Infrastructure and Their 
Impact on Environmental Resources, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 409, 420 (2008); Robert L. Fischman, 
From Words to Action: The Impact and Legal Status of the 2006 National Wildlife Refuge System 
Management Policies, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 77, 84 n.24 (2007). 
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kids who breathed the vapors in the air got lead into their 
bloodstreams and suffered from impaired nervous system 
development.18 Certainly none of this happened on purpose; it was 
an unexpected byproduct of an effort made for other purposes 
entirely. In a similar example, I have read recently that some 
subscribe to a theory that the active ingredient in some herbicides 
could cause various ailments, including autism.19 The theory is that 
herbicide residues remain on food, and when ingested they kill 
microbes in the human digestive tract—microbes that normally 
control other bodily functions, including brain functions. This all 
sounds rather far-fetched, a kind of biological Rube Goldberg 
machine, but a pathway of that sort would be akin to other 
commons byproducts: some unexpected environmental effect that 
comes from an effort to do something else altogether. 
Technology is a major source for commons problems of this sort, 
that is, the unexpected consequences that emerge in some domain 
entirely different from the aim of the technology itself. No one 
invented the automobile in order to pollute Los Angeles’s air; the 
automobile was invented to get around the city more easily. No one 
was aiming to kill birds when they built gleaming new skyscrapers. 
Who knew that migrating birds would crash into them by 
the millions?20 
Another generic reason for surprise is also related to technology, 
but here technological advances reveal information right away—
about unanticipated subjects. Technological developments 
sometimes thrust commons issues into the world’s attention, even 
while the technologists were trying to do something else altogether. 
All of a sudden, we can see a number of things that we did not 
notice before at all, and we are surprised. The most obvious example 
 
 18. Carol M. Rose, Scientific Innovation and Environmental Protection: Some Ethical 
Considerations, 32 ENVTL. L. 755, 762–63 (2002). 
 19. See, e.g., David Gumpert, It’s Everywhere: MIT Scientist Presents Dire Portrait of 
Damage from Monsanto’s Roundup, THE COMPLETE PATIENT (June 8, 2014), 
http://thecompletepatient.com/article/2014/june/9/its-everywhere-mit-scientist-presents-
dire-portrait-damage-monsantos-roundup (last visited Jan. 24, 2015) (reporting on lectures by 
MIT research scientist Stephanie Seneff). 
 20. The number of bird collisions with glass in buildings of all sorts has been estimated 
to come close to one billion (2014 estimate), as compared to about 600,000 for wind towers 
(2013 estimate). See Birds and Collisions, AMERICAN BIRD CONSERVANCY, 
http://www.abcbirds.org/abcprograms/policy/collisions/index.html (last visited              
Jan. 24, 2014). 
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is satellite technology, which has enabled scientists to see the hole in 
the ozone layer, and which now permits observers to see the fires in 
tropical rainforests.21 Those issues were not the reasons for satellite 
technology at all; it was aimed at other things, like military 
intelligence, telecommunications, and conventional weather 
forecasting. But satellite technology has allowed us to see other 
things too, quite unexpectedly. 
Another source of surprise about commons problems has to do 
not with the simple non-observance of commons problems, but 
rather with the refusal to see them. It is a rare person who wants to 
believe that her activities might cause bad things, especially when 
those activities are economically important. Thus, fishers have 
persistently denied that fish populations are affected by their fishing; 
they say the scientists are ignoramuses who know nothing about 
fish.22 Farmers worldwide ignore the effect that pesticides can have 
on bird populations, not to speak of their own health.23 Defenders of 
carbon emitters say that climate change is a fraud, or that it is 
unrelated to human activities.24 Over time, some of these refusals 
have given way to contrary facts. At least some fishers have gotten on 
board with effective conservation measures like no-fishing zones or 
cap-and-trade in fisheries,25 and farmers have generally adopted less 
toxic pesticides, although perhaps not as environmentally friendly as 
 
 21. See Ozone Hole over Antarctica, VISIBLE EARTH, 
http://visibleearth.nasa.gov/view.php?id=476 (last visited Mar. 21, 2015) (showing early 
satellite images of ozone hole); Rebecca Lindsey, From Forest to Field: How Fire is 
Transforming the Amazon, EARTH OBSERVATORY (June 8, 2004), 
http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/AmazonFire/ (showing inter alia satellite 
images of forest burns). 
 22. See DAVID DOBBS, THE GREAT GULF: FISHERMEN, SCIENTISTS, AND THE 
STRUGGLE TO REVIVE THE WORLD’S GREATEST FISHERY (2000); James William Merrill, 
Trawling for Meaning: A New Standard for “Best Scientific Information Available” in the 
Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Conservation Act, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 475–79 (2011), and 
sources cited therein. 
 23. See, e.g., Farmers Not Heeding Pesticide Warnings, IRIN NEWS (Sept. 10, 2012), 
http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=96223; Helen Thompson, Popular 
Pesticides Linked to Drops in Bird Populations, SMITHSONIAN.COM (July 10, 2014), 
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/popular-pesticides-linked-drops-bird-
population-180951971/?no-ist. 
 24. See STEVE GOREHAM, THE MAD, MAD, MAD WORLD OF CLIMATISM: MANKIND 
AND CLIMATE CHANGE MANIA (2012). 
 25. See Jonathan H. Adler & Nathaniel Stewart, Learning How to Fish: Catch Shares and 
the Future of Fishery Conservation, 31 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 150, 190 (2013). 
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had been hoped.26 Even some climate change scoffers have 
moderated their positions, though not all by any means.27 
Outright denial of commons problems is one reason to ignore 
these issues, but another reason to ignore them is that they may not 
seem to matter—at least until they turn into surprises. A major factor 
here is human ingenuity. When things get scarce, human beings are 
likely to find workarounds: better ways to produce the scarce things, 
better ways to use less of them, or substitutes that do almost as well 
(or in some cases better). Decades ago, the economist Julian Simon 
made a bet with biologist Paul Ehrlich when Ehrlich argued that 
humans were on the high road to running out of the earth’s natural 
resources. Simon bet that humans would do no such thing, and the 
proof was to be that a basket of specified resources would not 
increase in price (adjusted for inflation) over a period of ten years. 
Simon won the bet hands down.28 
However, there is a catch: Simon and Ehrlich made their bet not 
on common resources, but rather on resources that normally belong 
to some person or entity—commodities, including tin, nickel, and so 
on. With resources of that sort, someone owns the mine and 
someone else owns the refining plant, and they have good reason to 
pay attention as the resource becomes scarcer. With goods that are 
owned, increasing scarcity shows up pretty quickly in higher prices of 
the resource, and higher prices incentivize the human ingenuity that 
produces the workarounds of conservation and substitutes. 
Unfortunately, open-access common resources have a different 
profile. No one has to pay for the common resource itself, so these 
resource scarcities produce no price signals.29 The only prices that 
come into anyone’s calculations are the prices of extraction itself—
 
 26. See Thompson, supra note 23 (describing move away from DDT to what was 
thought to be safer pesticide). 
 27. See, e.g., Anthony Adragna, Ryan Acknowledges Human Involvement but Says Climate 
Change Science Unsettled, 45 ENVTL. REP. 2989 (Oct. 17, 2014) (describing Representative Paul 
Ryan’s shift in position on climate change, conceding human role though little else); Bjorn 
Lomborg, Climate Change Misdirection, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23, 2013, 7:05 PM), http://o
nline.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323485704578258172660564886 (same for 
former skeptic). 
 28. See PAUL SABIN, THE BET: PAUL EHRLICH, JULIAN SIMON, AND OUR GAMBLE 
OVER EARTH’S FUTURE 181–89 (2013) (describing Simon’s victory but also some ambiguities 
about it). 
 29. Carol M. Rose, Property and Emerging Environmental Issues—The Optimists vs. the 
Pessimists, 1 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 405, 408–11 (2012). 
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things like boats and equipment and the costs in time of chasing 
increasingly scarce goods—so that no one will stop until the good is 
so scarce that extraction itself is not worth the expenditure of effort 
and equipment. By this time, the resource itself is likely to be a mere 
remnant, and the former extractors, who have never invested in a 
workaround that conserves the common but now remnant resource, 
simply turn to some other resource. 
And so do consumers. Simon and Ehrlich’s erstwhile consumers 
of tin and nickel are still consuming tin and nickel. Higher resource 
prices sent a signal about those commodities and made it worthwhile 
to figure out conservation and substitutes early on, so that nickel and 
tin are still available. But consumers of wild fish are not consuming 
Orange Roughy anymore, because that stock is close to extinction.30 
Instead, they are eating some other species of wild fish, and they do 
not feel in their pocketbooks the cost of the new fish stock’s 
depletion either. No one does, because the new species is up for 
grabs—just like Orange Roughy once was. 
I have exaggerated here, because in fact, the very serious 
depletion of wild fish stocks has induced some governments to 
institute a number of conservation efforts, nowhere more than in 
New Zealand, to whose fishermen the Orange Roughy’s depletion 
was once a surprise. But it is not a surprise anymore, and New 
Zealand now has an extremely active fisheries management system.31 
On the other hand, many wild fish stocks continue to be overfished 
because they are still in a condition of open access, where the tragedy 
of the commons plays out to its doleful finish.32 The crashes of these 
stocks may not seem to matter as long as fishers can turn to some 
other species. One can only hope that fishers figure out a way to 
make jellyfish into an attractive kind of seafood. 
These, then, are some of the sources of surprise about commons 
tragedies: the reasons why we ignore what is happening to some 
common resource until its crash surprises us—or, if we are lucky, some 
new information source, prior to a crash, reveals the problem we were 
 
 30. See John Charles Kunich, Losing Nemo: The Mass Extinction Now Facing the World’s 
Ocean Hotspots, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 13 n.32, 31–32, 32 n.125 (2005). 
 31. See Kirsten M. Batkin, New Zealand’s Quota Management System: A Solution to the 
United States’ Federal Fisheries Management Crisis?, 36 NAT. RES. J. 855, 866–70 (1996). 
 32. See, e.g., Eric A. Bilsky, Conserving Marine Wildlife Through World Trade Law, 30 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 599, 601–604 (2009) (attributing worldwide “peril” in wild fish stocks 
to overfishing). 
DO NOT DELETE 10/8/2015 9:50 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2014 
1268 
blithely ignoring. There is a sort of generic reason behind all these 
reasons for ignoring commons problems, and this generic reason sets 
the background for our surprise when things go awry or the well runs 
dry unexpectedly. 
Open access means that no one has the right to exclude—that is, 
there are no property rights in the common resource that vest in any 
particular person, entity, or group. But if that is the case, there also is 
no way to make much money or to take other gains from conserving 
or investing in the open-access resource. But there is a further 
consequence for information: if there is no way to make gains from 
something, we tend not to bother to find out much about it.33 
The possibility for economic gain is a huge driver of information 
collection and investigation. But where that possibility is missing, 
investigation is much less intense. And so, we get lots of information 
about the ways to catch fish, including the technology for catching 
them, but not so much (until relatively recently) about the larger 
stocks from which individual fish come. To be sure, sheer curiosity 
and perhaps affection can lead people to invest in information about 
some unowned things, for example birds, which fascinate 
many people. 
But in the meantime, a great deal of information gathering goes 
into activities that do make gains, even if, or maybe especially if, 
those activities can use open-access resources without paying for 
them. I mentioned lead additives earlier; these are an example of the 
information aspect of commons problems. Back in the 1920s, there 
was considerable research and development to make lead additives 
that would enhance automobile engine performance. There was even 
some research about the direct effects of lead on those who worked 
with lead additives, especially when the workers started to behave 
oddly. But there was very little research about the damage that 
vaporized lead in air might do, especially to children’s mental 
acuity.34 Generally speaking, these lapses are not anyone’s fault. The 
problem is just that open access in physical resources—like ambient 
air—not only tends to leave the resource open to dissipation; open 
 
 33. See Rose, supra note 18, at 758–66 (discussing the relationship between property 
and information); cf. Jason Scott Johnston, The Rule of Capture and the Economic Dynamics of 
Natural Resource Use and Survival Under Open Access Management Regimes, 35 ENVTL. L. 
855, 876 (2005) (noting that information about open-access resources is a public good, whose 
provision depends on politics). 
 34. See Rose, supra note 18, at 762–63, and sources cited therein. 
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access also dissipates the investment in getting information about 
the resource. 
The absence of property rights, then, is a kind of generic reason 
for surprise about the decimation of commons resources. No 
property means no chances for gain—a scenario that sets the stage 
for simply ignoring open-access resources, and then, of course, 
being surprised at their degradation.  
I do not want to leave the topic of sources of surprise about the 
commons—the Hardin variety, that is—without mentioning what 
Dan Farber has called probabilities behaving badly.35 Farber is 
interested in the kinds of nonlinear sequences of interactions that one 
sees in fractal geometry. These ill-behaved probabilities occur when 
some combination of seemingly minor events lead to major follow-on 
events and sometimes disaster scenarios. The classic hypothetical is 
something like the butterfly that flaps its wings somewhere in the 
tropics and sets in motion a train of events that ends up with a 
hurricane that strikes Cape Cod. As of now, we cannot foresee these 
events except in broad generalities on the one hand, or very short-
term predictions on the other. In the broad generality category, we 
know that we are very likely to have hurricanes in certain seasons in 
certain general locations; we know too that earthquakes are bound to 
happen at some time in some locations. Alternatively, in the very short 
term, we know that a tornado is forming this afternoon near a mid-
sized city in Kansas. We just do not know much in the middle ground 
between the long-term generality and the very short-term actuality. 
But we do see the aftermaths, such as the results of wildly 
disproportionate weather events in the news. In November 2013, it 
was the terrible photographs of dazed people walking in the 
wreckage of the Philippine city of Tacloban after Typhoon Haiyan. 
Several years back, it was the equally terrible pictures of people 
thrown together in the Superdome in New Orleans after Hurricane 
Katrina. These exceedingly unpleasant surprises are different from 
the other commons surprises, where we ourselves have been blithely 
re-enacting the tragedy of the commons without paying attention, 
and then we suddenly realize we have a problem. With probabilities 
behaving badly, we are the ones who are suddenly thrust into a 
commons, a kind of commons of nature where all kinds of events 
 
 35. Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory and 
Environmental Uncertainty, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 145 (2003). 
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enter and build on one another without restraint. The surprise is not 
that we have devastated a commons, but that this commons has 
devastated us. 
But to finish this section on a cheerier note, in a very limited 
class of physical resources, surprises from open access are not 
unpleasant and difficult, but rather fortuitous and happy. This was 
the topic of my old article, The Comedy of the Commons. Roads, 
waterways, other transportation and communication lanes and areas, 
possibly even recreational areas and pleasure grounds—all can create 
pleasant surprises in a state of open access. At least within the limits 
of capacity and overcrowding, more is better: more trade, more 
commerce, more network effects, more scale economies, more 
conversations, more fellow feeling, more people at the party.36 As I 
said at the outset, this article about a “comic” commons began with 
the locations needed for travel and communication, but it enjoyed a 
second life in connection with intellectual resources, so at this point 
I would like to turn to those. 
II. INTELLECTUAL RESOURCES AND THE SURPRISES FROM THE 
COMMONS 
In the realm of physical resources, the surprises of open access 
are very likely to be unpleasant, with the important but limited 
exceptions of communication lanes and common gathering spaces. 
All of us can recall the arguments for property rights in physical 
resources. As opposed to open access, propertization is said to avoid 
the destruction of resources in wasteful practices and conflicts. 
Instead, property encourages investment and curtails free riding, 
allowing owners to reap what they sow;37 moreover, by identifying 
owners, property encourages trade and the movement of resources 
to those who most value them. These arguments for property are, in 
effect, warnings about the dangerous surprises that come from 
leaving physical resources in open access. 
But with intellectual resources, surprises from open access are 
more ambiguous: some are unpleasant, but many more can be 
positive, and some are a mixture. For intellectual resources, unlike 
physical resources, there is no depletion or scarcity caused by 
 
 36. Rose, supra note 1. 
 37. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND                
4–9 (1766). 
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multiple uses. Here, the whole case for property rests on the second 
part of the property argument: encouraging investment—particularly 
creative investment—by shutting off free riding and permitting trade 
toward the highest-value users. But even with this thinner rationale 
for property in intellectual matters, the case is ambiguous, because 
open access in intellectual resources also creates surprises. 
At least some of these surprises are positive rather than tragic. 
Although I will have to limit my examples, because I am something 
of an amateur in intellectual property (IP), there are some obvious 
ones. As with physical resources, technology plays a major role in 
creating access to intellectual resources. Everyone knows some 
examples of the ways that technology has made knowledge more 
accessible: one can start with the printing press, then add the 
typewriter, then the copy machine, and then digital technology, to 
mention just a few of the new technologies along the way. Medieval 
musicians and troubadours depended on brain technology, i.e., 
memory, while the medieval learned professions depended on the 
technology of handwriting. But when movable type printing arrived, 
songs and poems and books became vastly more available, and this 
new access encouraged education and then more technology as well. 
That is the good part of the open access story. The bad part of 
intellectual open access, at least arguably, was the invisible 
discouragement that came from free riding—a discouragement that 
may have undermined investment in creating the songs and poems 
and pictures and machines in the first place, because others could copy 
them and take some of the credit and the proceeds.38 The industrial 
revolution of the later eighteenth and nineteenth centuries exemplified 
this dilemma. England was a major source of new technology, 
particularly the technology that assisted in the manufacture of textiles. 
With their new inventions, English mills could create vastly more 
textile products, at lower costs than the non-mechanized technologies. 
Along the way, inventors got more ideas for further improvements to 
machines for spinning, weaving, and other manufactures, as 
innovation built on innovation.39 
 
 38. See Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal 
Conditions of the Emergence of the “Author”, 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUDS. 425 (1984) 
(discussing eighteenth-century German writers’ efforts to establish ownership via a cult 
of “genius”). 
 39. DORON S. BEN-ATAR, TRADE SECRETS: INTELLECTUAL PIRACY AND THE ORIGINS 
OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL POWER 10–12, 83–84 (2004). 
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But free riding was a constant threat to this burst of 
technological inventiveness. I recently caught up with Doron Ben-
Atar’s book about national industrial policy in that era, roughly the 
turn of the eighteenth to the nineteenth century. Most nations’ basic 
policy was simple: to get access to information about new inventions 
coming from other countries while preventing similar information 
from leaking out of their own borders.40 The methods were crude. 
We here in the United States had policies much like those of other 
countries; we encouraged craftsmen and machinists to come here 
with their technological knowledge, but at the same time we, like 
others, did not permit the export of technological inventions 
originating inside the country.41 
We have all seen the replication of this sequence in digital 
technology. On the one hand, new copying technology has opened 
up unprecedented access to intellectual products, along with an 
explosion of new mixes and matches of ideas. But on the other hand, 
arguments and legislation have followed, taking the position that 
copying undermines creativity and investment in creative work. By 
this time, though, it is not actually much of a surprise that this two-
step has appeared. 
Are there any surprises, then, in what might be thought to lead a 
tragedy of the commons in intellectual resources? One such surprise 
might be the lengths to which inventors and creators (or rather their 
investors) will go to block open access to their creations. The most 
recent major copyright legislation extends copyright protection to 
what amounts to three generations, and it applies not only to new 
works but to those that were already in existence at the time of the 
act, and that would have come out of copyright earlier under the 
laws in effect at the time of their creation. This of course makes 
something of a mockery of the incentivizing rationale for the new 
statute.42 And then there is the technology that secures what is called 
digital rights management (DRM), i.e., the technology that, among 
other things, might make your electronic book disappear or that 
might prevent you from copying it and passing it on. Technology of 
this sort was obviously a challenge and a magnet for hackers, but 
further technological defenses against hackers could be costly for the 
 
 40. Id. at 8–15. 
 41. Id. at 78–141. 
 42. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 248–49 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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manufacturers. And so, after DRM technology was invented, 
legislation followed to make it illegal to circumvent DRM—
legislation that coincidentally may extend protection further than 
copyright itself, for example, preventing people from “cheating” at 
digital games.43 
There is certainly opposition to the privatization of intellectual 
products through IP, but opposition to these privatization efforts has 
typically been slow to develop and rather ineffective in a legislative 
process historically dominated by insiders.44 But then, another major 
surprise is that proponents of open access have actually emerged and 
have started to make themselves visible and audible.45 Those 
proponents include Larry Lessig and Yochai Benkler, who were 
mentioned earlier, but also many others as well, including academics 
like Mark Lemley, Amy Kapczynski, Jamie Boyle, and the whole 
group around the Creative Commons alternative to 
conventional copyright.46 
A third surprise has been the explosion of open-access activities 
in the realm of intellectual efforts, ostensibly with no real payoff to 
the players aside from interest and fun. Here we see the wild 
proliferation of YouTube creations; the artists who now compose 
new works made up of other peoples’ posted photos; the flash mobs 
who organize through social media to sing Handel’s Messiah in food 
courts—or to protest against dictatorial regimes the world over; and 
of course the happy surprises of Wikipedia and Linux. The upshot of 
all this is that open access in intellectual resources has created 
surprises too. Some are unhappy, mimicking the free-riding 
problems familiar in physical resources. But a number have been 
happy, in a higher proportion than is the case with 
physical resources. 
 
 43. Joseph P. Liu, Paracopyright—A Peculiar Right to Control Access, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AT THE EDGE: THE CONTESTED CONTOURS OF IP 227, 229, 242–44 (Rochelle 
Cooper Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 2014). 
 44. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 23, 70 (2006). 
 45. See, e.g., Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (arguing that extension of copyright act violated 
incentivizing purpose). 
 46. Works by all these authors, except Amy Kapczynski, are cited in Anupam Chander & 
Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1331 passim (2004); 
for Kapczynski, see The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual Property 
Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970 (2012). Chander and Sunder have some criticism of the 
open-access idea, however, particularly as applied to less-developed areas and indigenous issues. 
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III. THE PROSPECTS 
At this point I would like to turn to the question of what comes 
next. How can we avoid the unpleasant surprises of open-access 
resources and keep the happy ones? Here I especially want to turn to 
the late Elinor Ostrom’s version of the commons, the limited 
commons, as a potential antidote to the “tragedy of the commons” 
in Hardin’s account. 
Ostrom famously complained that Hardin and his followers took 
too narrow an approach to solving the problems of open access. She 
complained that Hardin et al. proposed either individual property or 
statist intervention as the only potential solutions to the problems of 
open access.47 Ostrom’s idea was that there is a third way, 
exemplified in the practices of some communities. These 
communities have continued for many years, even centuries, to hold 
a set of critical resources—such as pastures, fisheries, or forests—in 
common for insiders, while closing them to outsiders. In this way, 
these communities have continued to enjoy the advantages of 
common access, particularly the economies of scale that may 
accompany multiple-participation; but they also incorporate the 
manageability, conservation, and investment that accompany 
exclusive property. 
Meanwhile, there are a couple of surprises about limited commons 
too. One surprise is the fact that we have limited commons regimes at 
all. This is in itself a kind of pleasant development, but it is an 
unexpected one. 
Community-based regimes for governing common pool 
resources are reenacting a kind of property too—it is just a group-
based property. And that is the surprise. James Krier long ago made 
the point that if people fail to solve the commons problem at the 
resource level, say, overgrazing or overfishing or polluting, then it is 
a mystery how they solve it at the level of organizing a management 
regime.48 Just as commons issues at the resource level are problems 
of collective action, organizing a management regime is another 
collective-action problem. This would be the case whether the 
management regime is based on public intervention, group-based 
property, as in the case of limited commons, or even individual 
 
 47. OSTROM, supra note 15, at 12–14. 
 48. James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
325, 338 (1992). 
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property. Issues of structure, membership, contribution, payoffs, 
monitoring, and enforcement must all be addressed, and anyone 
who has run a committee can attest to the hard work involved—and 
to the temptation to shirk and free ride on the organizing efforts of 
others. And so it is a surprise to find that we do in fact have limited 
common property regimes, just as it is a surprise that we have any 
other kinds of resource-management regimes, including 
private property. 
Some have been literally surprised to find such community-based 
regimes. I heard Ostrom herself say many times that when Nepal’s 
central government began a program of state-sponsored irrigation 
works in the mid-twentieth century, the plans ignored the existing 
irrigation works. But irrigation works were there. They were just not 
the type that centralizing officials noticed. They were numerous, 
small, do-it-yourself irrigation systems created and managed by local 
farmers, and as it turned out, they generally out-performed the state-
sponsored works.49 
Ostrom’s Governing the Commons compiled information on 
many regimes of this sort from all over the world, not only 
irrigation systems, but also community-managed grazing areas, 
fisheries, and forests. So did many other writings of the 1980s and 
1990s. James Acheson described Maine’s “lobster gangs” and their 
collective management practices for lobster fisheries;50 Acheson, 
together with Bonnie McCay, collected articles about a variety of 
common property regimes from all corners of the globe for fishing, 
grazing, and agriculture;51 my Yale colleague Bob Ellickson wrote 
his famous Order Without Law,52 describing the very subtle norms 
and social controls among ranchers of rural Shasta County, 
 
 49. Ostrom, writing with some other authors, mentioned this incident and its aftermath 
in PAUL BENJAMIN ET AL., INSTITUTIONS, INCENTIVES, AND IRRIGATION IN NEPAL 29–30, 
41 (1994), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnabt150.pdf; see also Elinor Ostrom 
et al., Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges, 284 SCIENCE 278, 280 (1999) 
(citing the Nepal example to argue that because the norms that make local farmer-operated 
irrigation systems function are “not visible” to “well-meaning donors,” the latter advocate the 
replacement of “primitive” systems with governmentally directed technical projects that 
reduce productivity). 
 50. JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE (1988). 
 51. THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS: THE CULTURE AND ECOLOGY OF COMMUNAL 
RESOURCES (Bonnie J. McCay & James M. Acheson eds., 1987). 
 52. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES (1991). 
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California; Lisa Bernstein described the close community of 
diamond merchants and their intricate practices governing trade 
and dispute resolution.53 
These community-based property arrangements have had some 
common characteristics. The first is that they limit access; not 
everyone can have access, but generally only the community of 
people contributing to maintenance. Second, transfer and movement 
in and out of the regime are not easy, so that group membership—
and thus group know-how—is relatively stable. A third characteristic 
is related: the rules and conventions of the group are likely to be very 
complex, creating what scholars have called an anti-commons that 
actually protects the commons by preventing easy entrance and exit. 
A fourth characteristic is the reward system: aside from access to the 
commonly managed resource, other rewards and punishments are 
likely to be indirect, taking the form of prestige in the case of reward, 
and neighborhood disapproval and even shunning in the case 
of punishment. 
For an example, take community-based irrigation systems: their 
benefits are for the exclusive use of the community of contributors to 
the ditch system, and not for outsiders. As to the insiders, the 
contributing farmers keep an eye on one another; they complain and 
gossip about those who take too much water or shirk on maintenance 
of the ditches; they may select a particularly trusted and respected 
person as the water master who decides allocation and responsibilities; 
they may add another internal dispute resolution system, as in the case 
of medieval Spanish irrigators.54 
Moreover, arrangements of this kind are not just about physical 
resources; analogous patterns sometimes emerge in intellectual 
property. Rob Merges has described groups of scientists who organize 
themselves in similar ways,55 as has Katherine Strandburg for surgeons’ 
organizations.56 In these cases of intellectual resources, the members 
 
 53. Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in 
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992). 
 54. OSTROM, supra note15, at 69–81; see also Bernstein, supra note 53, at 123–27 
(describing dispute resolution in the diamond industry). 
 55. See Robert P. Merges, Property Rights Theory and the Commons: The Case of Scientific 
Research, 13 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 145 (1996). 
 56. See Katherine J. Strandburg, Legal But Unacceptable: Pallin v. Singer and Physician 
Patenting Norms, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE: THE CONTESTED CONTOURS 
OF IP 321 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 2014). 
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of the group share information among themselves; they reserve special 
prestige for major contributors; they reject outsiders who are not in 
the know; and they decry and shun insiders who want to take their 
achievements outside the system. All these practices encourage 
contribution to the maintenance of what Strandburg calls groups 
of “user-innovators.”57 
One might ask why members of these community-based 
property regimes do not take the next step to individual property. 
That is, why not have individual farms instead of common grazing; 
patents and copyrights instead of professional exchanges? That this 
step may not be taken is something of a surprise in itself, given the 
volume of literature about the way that property rights supposedly 
evolve from open access, through limited common property, to an 
end-point of individual property.58 But a number of limited common 
property regimes have been quite stable over long periods of time. 
Perhaps the classic examples are the irrigation systems of eastern 
Spain mentioned above, which have been in continuous existence 
since Muslim times.59 
Why do limited common property regimes resist 
individualization? Some answers are now quite well known, and they 
revolve around the advantages of limited commons regimes. By 
comparison to completely individualized property, limited commons 
permit the enjoyment of scale economies in all or part of a set of 
economic activities, as in community irrigation systems, or, as Henry 
Smith has illustrated, in the mixture of individual and common 
elements in the very long-lasting medieval common fields regimes of 
England.60 Similarly, in the case of information-sharing innovator 
groups, limited common organization permits network effects to 
fertilize individual creativity.61 
Community-based property arrangements notoriously limit 
 
 57. Id. at 322. 
 58. See, e.g., Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of 
the American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163 (1975) (describing property as evolving toward 
individual property rights). 
 59. OSTROM, supra note 15, at 72–76, 95. 
 60. See Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 
29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (2000). 
 61. See Strandburg, supra note 56; Merges, supra note 55; see also Amy Kapczynski, 
Order Without Intellectual Property Law? A Case Study in Open Science (Nov. 11, 2014) 
(unpublished paper) (on file with author) (describing an international network of 
influenza scientists). 
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entrance by outsiders, but limitations on outsider entry can be an 
advantage for maintaining insider trust and group stability. Stability in 
turn makes it possible to maintain complex resources without excessive 
transaction costs. Thus, a stable user group can maintain a complicated 
turn-taking system for fishing in a particular location, while a stable 
theater troupe can manage all the aspects of setup and performance with 
a minimum of re-education. 
Another point is that group-based economic relationships may 
spill over into other relationships. Community management can act 
as a risk-sharing or insurance institution, as members help one 
another out in times of uneven fortune.62 Recreation and fun are also 
often built into limited commons. All those spring festivals in the 
country and conversations at the clubhouse create opportunities for 
sociability and fun, while building solidarity in the group.63 
Those are the good parts of limited common property or 
community management regimes. However, there are some deficits 
as well. Limited common property regimes miss out on certain 
aspects of modernist individual property, with its distinct boundaries 
and easy transfer. Movement of goods to higher value users can be 
impeded when insiders cannot sell to outsiders. The insiders, 
meanwhile, can settle into patterns of hierarchical rigidity and 
innovative sclerosis.64 Hanoch Dagan and Michael Heller, in their 
article on the “liberal commons,” complained of a democratic deficit 
in what Ostrom considered successful commons,65 and Brigham 
Daniels suggested that these kinds of limited commons regimes 
might have a creativity deficit as well.66 
Moreover, it is not clear that either the democracy deficit or the 
innovation deficit is curable in limited common property regimes. 
The very patterns that hold these regimes together can stifle political 
change, and they can stifle major innovation too; outsiders are not 
welcome, and new ideas may not be welcome either. For example, 
 
 62. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1341–44 (1993). 
 63. See Rose, supra note 1, at 740–41, 758–59 (describing traditional protection of 
recreational uses in customary law of the commons). 
 64. Carol M. Rose, Ostrom and the Lawyers: The Impact of Governing the Commons on 
the American Legal Academy, 5 INT’L. J. COMMONS 28, 33–34 (2011). 
 65. Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549,                   
565–66 (2001). 
 66. Brigham Daniels, Emerging Commons and Tragic Institutions, 37 ENVTL. L. 515, 522 
(2007) (arguing that commons institutions may favor stability over emerging values, 
blocking change). 
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there is a good deal of user innovation within the sphere of normal 
science—and it is very valuable too, perhaps the chief source of 
scientific advance. But major new ideas, outside the normal box, may 
have to occur outside the ordinary group context. Dava Sobel’s 
wonderful book, Longitude, gives an example: the cozy norms of 
eighteenth century scientists rejected the clockmaker as a mere 
tinker, but he was the one who solved the problem of longitude.67 
IV. CAN HARDIN AND OSTROM COMBINE? 
Here it might be worthwhile to pause to consider whether there 
are any new ways in which the Ostrom commons might get us 
through some of the difficulties of the Hardin commons—that is, 
new applications of the limited commons in the world of open-
access tragedies. 
The short answer is a cautious “maybe”—and a very cautious one 
with respect to physical resources. In recent years, there has been a 
good deal of talk about ecosystem-based approaches, particularly in 
watershed management. Watersheds of any significance are likely to 
be too big for individual ownership, but too local to be managed by 
a distant central government. Then too, watersheds are complicated 
resource clusters. And finally, the goal of watershed management is 
generally conservationist rather than development-oriented. Limited 
commons approaches thus seem attractive, given their association 
with multi-party, stable management of complex resources. 
However, some problems loom, because it is not entirely clear 
how we might deploy the Ostrom commons in ecosystem 
management. Taking the central case of watersheds, the first 
problem is the heterogeneity of what are called “stakeholders” in 
these endeavors. In the modern watershed, unlike the medieval 
common fields or the ancient irrigators of eastern Spain, residents 
may include more urbanites along with rural types, and all are not 
involved in a set of common economic enterprises; few may be 
managing stock, and none taking part in a joint effort to cut turfs, as 
they did in medieval times. In fact, in most modern watersheds, 
some uses are likely to conflict with other uses. Rafters and fishers 
conflict with each other, and both conflict with irrigators. A related 
problem is that of devising a reward system for participation. The 
 
 67. DAVA SOBEL, LONGITUDE: THE TRUE STORY OF A LONE GENIUS WHO SOLVED 
THE GREATEST SCIENTIFIC PROBLEM OF HIS TIME (1995). 
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very heterogeneity of the group makes prestige a doubtful form of 
payoff; farmers are unlikely to care much about high esteem from 
rafters, and vice versa. 
It may be, then, that with respect to heterogeneous physical 
resources like ecosystems, management will often require something 
more than the traditional characteristics of limited common property 
regimes—perhaps something more akin to what Dagan and Heller 
call the liberal commons, with opportunities for mutual education, 
voting, horse trades, overt disagreement, and even exit, along with a 
certain degree of external prodding from governmental entities. 
With respect to intellectual ecosystems, the limited common 
property model may adapt more readily, although it is unlikely to 
look very traditional. Indeed, it is here that the limited version of the 
commons can mix more easily with the open-access version. I have 
become increasingly interested in volunteer systems of economic 
organization, and in the current era, information gathering turns out 
to generate quite a number of such systems. In various citizen 
science projects, one can glimpse something like a mixture of 
Hardin’s open-access commons and Ostrom’s community-managed 
commons. In these projects, amateurs volunteer to measure 
rainwater, count birds, keep calendars of flowering plants, and map 
parts of the night sky, among many other things. One can discern 
the mixture of Hardin and Ostrom in other domains too, as in the 
crowd funding of small enterprises, and of course in the Linux 
operating system and Wikipedia Online Encyclopedia. 
What makes these mixed commons organizational models work? 
Take rainwater measurement. First, modularity: the tasks are well 
defined and doable in small portions, and the information to be 
gathered is quite single-minded; it is just rain. Second, norms: the 
participants are supposed to perform certain tasks, but these are 
relatively focused and painless: just write it down every day, and fill 
in this or that form on a computer screen. Third, fun: participants 
like to do the work, and they are interested in seeing the compiled 
results that come from the information provided by the whole group 
of volunteers. Fourth, leadership: someone has to put all this 
together and keep it running. It seems that many people are more 
willing to follow than to lead; initiative is in much demand. 
Fifth, and perhaps most interesting, is the factor of relaxed 
boundaries. Participation in citizen science and other volunteer 
enterprises is not confined to insiders, as with traditional irrigation 
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systems, or diamond merchant groups, or even surgeons’ networks, 
but rather is open to new members. Still, even with these porous 
boundaries, some are participants and some are not. One interesting 
comparison for participation might be with churches or other religious 
organizations, where membership means something but is also open 
to outsiders. Here too, Ostrom’s commons organization meets 
Hardin’s open access commons. 
On reflection, the same might be said of the features of Dagan 
and Heller’s liberal commons, which have considerably more porous 
boundaries and opportunities for movement than the traditional 
limited commons. While the analysis of physical resources has 
traditionally preceded the analysis of intellectual resources, for the 
very good reason that physical resources can be perceived and 
monitored more easily, one more surprise might be that modern 
crowdsourcing enterprises can reverse the pattern. Intellectual 
enterprises, rather than physical resources, might become the 
location where we learn how to combine Hardin’s commons 
with Ostrom’s. 
V. ONE LAST SURPRISE—OR IS IT THE FIRST? 
I would like to mention one other surprising element in dealing 
with open-access resources, one that brings us back to the mysterious 
aspects of commons solutions. This is a phenomenon that occurs in 
the worst of all these surprises, the probabilities behaving badly, 
when the disasters that we knew might come sometime do indeed 
come and turn our world upside down. 
Rebecca Solnit, in a book entitled A Paradise Built in Hell, 
describes the temporary euphoria of people caught in these 
surprises.68 She elaborates on acts of astonishing generosity in 
disasters like the San Francisco earthquake of 1906—of people 
opening doors to houses and stores, giving away everything, working 
day and night on rescue efforts. If people can remember these 
terrible times later, they remember them as the most blissful days of 
their lives. 
It is not at all clear where this psychological state comes from. It 
does not sound at all like the behavior of the classic rational actor. In 
fact, it seems just the reverse: a temporary euphoria that entails 
 
 68. REBECCA SOLNIT, A PARADISE BUILT IN HELL: THE EXTRAORDINARY 
COMMUNITIES THAT ARISE IN DISASTER (2009). 
DO NOT DELETE 10/8/2015 9:50 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2014 
1282 
forgetting rational calculation and immediate gains and losses as well 
as long-term discount rates, and instead giving away everything right 
now, right here. 
But then, one may have to suppress the rational actor to break 
through any kind of miserably unsolvable commons issue, to come 
out to a happy surprise on the other side. What Solnit describes may 
be an exaggerated and particularly intense version of the moment of 
trust and risk-taking that enables human beings to break through any 
kind of collective action issue, whether it is the small-scale prisoner’s 
dilemma or the larger tragedy of the commons. We may not 
understand this mysterious turn of mind at the foundation of 
cooperative behavior, but we know that it happens, and much of our 
social and political life depends on it—and our economic and 
environmental life as well. 
 
